Evaluation via extended orderings: empirical findings from west and east by Gaertner, Wulf & Jungeilges, Jochen
Evaluation via Extended Orderings:
Empirical Findings from West and East
by
Wulf Gaertner
University of Osnabrück
and
Jochen Jungeilges
University of Vilniaus
Discussion Paper Distributional Analysis Research Programme
No. DARP 42 The Toyota Centre
March 1999 Suntory and Toyota International
Centres for Economics and
Related Disciplines
London School of Economics
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
Abstract
The theoretical background of the empirical investigations to be reported to this paper are
positionalist aggregation functions which are numerically representable.  More concretely,
the broad Borda rule is proposed as an aggregation mechanism for the case of a complete set
(profile) of so-called individual extended orderings.  The Borda rule becomes an
interpersonal positional rule and it is modified to reflect considerations of equity.  Such
considerations are introduced by transforming the original linear weighting system such that
an equity axiom well known from the social choice literature is satisfied.
Students both from Osnabrück University and from universities in the Baltic States were
confronted with questionnaires that describe six “situations”, most of which reflect different
aspects of needs.  All situations start from the preference structure which underlies the equity
axiom, viz. There is one person who is worst off under two alternatives x and y.  This person
is better off under x than under y whereas all the other individuals who are introduced
successively are better off under y than under x.   Three of the points we are focusing on are:
(a) What is the percentage of respondents satisfying the equity axiom?  (b) How often do the
students revise their initial decision when more and more people join the side of the more
advantaged?  (c) Are there major differences in the empirical results between West and East?
We have found that Western students satisfy the equity axiom to a high degree but they are
not willing to follow Rawls’s unique focus on the worst of (group of) individual(s)
unconditionally, i.e. independently of the number of persons involved.  There are stunning
differences between the results from the East and the West.  Though the number of students
from Osnabrück involved in the study is much higher than the number of students from the
three Baltic States, it is fair to say that aspects of neediness and the protection of basic human
rights currently are not very high “on the agenda” among the probants from the East who
participated in our investigation.
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1 Introduction
There is no such thing as the theory of justice, neither in the realm of philosophy nor
in the sphere of economics where we propose to use the term \distributive justice" in
order to indicate that here, the issue of justice is most often linked up with a problem
of redistribution. Over more than two centuries utilitarianism had been the dominant
school of thought for issues of welfare and redistribution. Utilitarianism is outcome{
oriented and consequentialist in nature. It focuses on maximizing the sum of individual
utilities; however, as several of its critics pointed out, it is largely unconcerned with the
interpersonal distribution of this sum. Over the last fty years or so, both economic
theory and philosophy have come up with quite a few new solution concepts. Rawls's
(1971) theory of justice and bargaining theory a la Nash (1950) and Kalai{Smorodinsky
(1975) are among the most prominent new approaches. While the latter use the concept
of cardinal utility without any trace of interpersonal comparability of utility (utilitari-
anism is based on cardinal utilities and interpersonal comparability), Rawls's proposal
is grounded on ordinal utility and level comparability. Economists have focused on his
second principle of justice in particular, the so{called dierence principle which requires
that social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are to the greatest
benet of the least advantaged members of society. At the heart of Rawls's maximin
or dierence principle lies an equity axiom to which we shall come back in due course.
Rawls himself chose to judge benets not in terms of utilities but through an index of
\primary goods" which comprise the basic liberties, opportunities and powers, income
and wealth. This shows that this concept is not outcome{oriented but means{oriented.
Let us consider the following cake{division problem which was discussed by Sen
(1982, pp. 19{20). One unit of cake is to be divided among three people each of whom
prefers a larger amount of cake to a smaller amount. In situation I person 1 is \very
well{o" while individuals 2 and 3 are \quite poor", in situation II person 1 is \poor"
whereas individuals 2 and 3 are \quite wealthy". Which of the two alternatives should
be chosen in the two situations?
Let the two situations and the alternative divisions be as follows:
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Situation I
1 2 3
alt. a 4/5 1/10 1/10
alt. b 3/5 1/5 1/5
Situation II
1 2 3
alt. a' 1/5 2/5 2/5
alt. b' 1/10 9/20 9/20
Since preferences are assumed to be monotonic, individual 1 clearly prefers a to b
in case I and a' to b' in case II, whereas persons 2 and 3 prefer b to a in the rst
situation and b' to a' in the second. In other words, the preference proles are identical
in both cases. Does this statement imply that the division problem should be resolved
in exactly the same way in both situations?
Let us suppose that \pieces of cake" lend themselves to some degree of interper-
sonal comparability. Furthermore, let cake for the moment be the only determinant of
individual well{being. Then it is safe to say that under situation I person 1 is better
o in a than in b, and is again better o than persons 2 and 3 in b who are again
better o under b than under a. In situation II, individuals 2 and 3 are both better
situated under b
0
than under a
0
and are better o than person 1 under a
0
who again
fares better under a
0
than under b
0
. When we now focus on the worst position taken by
any individual under the two alternatives in cases I and II, we come to the conclusion
that in situation I, the worst position under b is better than the worst position under a,
whereas in situation II just the opposite is the case (a
0
better than b
0
). Therefore, the
social evaluation of situations I and II may change, once some degree of comparability
among the individuals has been established.
The major part of this paper will be devoted to empirical studies on distributive
issues in the West and in the East. In the years 1989, 1990 and 1993, 1994 respectively,
undergraduate students in economics and business administration at the University of
Osnabruck had been asked to evaluate particular situations. These situations that we
describe in an Appendix deal with distributive issues of various kinds and it was our
intention to learn how students grapple with these situations. The structure of the
latter and the type of questions we asked have to be seen in relation to our underlying
theoretical model. We consider an approach that uses the positionalist information
contained in a particular commodity allocation (as in the example depicted above). As
the appropriate collective choice mechanism, we study nonlinear ranking rules. One can
expect that answers to distributional issues will depend on the particular problem at
stake, on the economic and political environment in which the situation is embedded,
but also on the cultural background and the personal experience or \biography" of the
persons asked
1
. Therefore, we put our problems of distributive content not only before
Western students but also before students from the East. Students from the Baltic
states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were asked to evaluate the situations that we
had earlier presented to the German students at Osnabruck. We feel that in an era
of globalization it becomes increasingly important to know how people from dierent
countries think about certain issues that are fundamental for societies' economic and
1
Our empirical research was inspired by the investigation of Yaari and Bar{Hillel (1984) who ex-
amined situations of needs, tastes and beliefs, among other aspects.
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political development. Answers to questions of common concern may shed some light
on why a particular society may support or rmly reject a certain type of (economic)
policy. Before we turn to a description and discussion of our various empirical results,
a brief statement of the theoretical background of our analysis is called for.
2 Theoretical Background
Let X be a nite set of feasible social states and let N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng be a nite set
of individuals. We dene R as the set of all orderings on X. For every R 2 R,
xRy for any x; y 2 X is to be interpreted as stating that from society's point of
view, x is at least as good as y. We next dene T (X  N) as the set of all logically
possible extended orderings and
~
R
i
2 T (X  N) as individual i's extended ordering.
f
~
R
i
g stands for a prole of individual extended orderings. Let us now consider the
n{fold cartesian product of T (X  N), denoted by
~
R, and let us dene a mapping
f :
~
R ! R as a positionalist aggregation function (PAF ). In our approach, we have
restricted the domain of the PAF to
~
R


~
R, thus satisfying Sen's (1970) identity
axiom. Next we dene an interpersonal rank order rule F such that for any f
~
R
i
g and
any x; y 2 X : xF (f
~
R
i
g)y ,
P
i
P
j

i
(x; j) 
P
i
P
j

i
(y; j), where 
i
(x; j) represents
the weight (real number) of j's position under alternative x according to the extended
ordering of person i. We wish to say that a PAF is numerically representable if and
only if there exists an interpersonal ranking rule F such that xRy , xF (f
~
R
i
g)y.
As particular forms of the rank order rule F specied above one can dene (a) the
linear ranking rule F
L
such that for any f
~
R
i
g and any x; y 2 X:
xF
L
(f
~
R
i
g)y ,
P
i
P
j
r
i
(x; j) 
P
i
P
j
r
i
(y; j),
where r
i
(x; k) is determined by the number of positions that are ranked below (x; k)
by person i, and (b) transformed interpersonal ranking rules F
T
such that for any f
~
R
i
g
and any x; y 2 X:
xF
T
(f
~
R
i
g)y,
P
i
P
j
'(r
i
(x; j)) 
P
i
P
j
'(r
i
(y; j)),
with '() strictly increasing and nonlinear over its domain. Again, a particular form
of the latter class F
T
are the equity{oriented ranking rules such that for any f
~
R
i
g and
any x; y 2 X:
xF
EQT
(f
~
R
i
g)y,
P
i
P
j
'(r
i
(x; j)) 
P
i
P
j
'(r
i
(y; j)),
with '() strictly concave and '
0
() > 0 everywhere.
What kind of properties ought to be fullled by interpersonal ranking rules? In
Gaertner (1992) several conditions were specied and it was also shown that a so{
called stability condition (Gardenfors (1973)) as well as a requirement called strong
positionalist independence (Hansson (1973)) can serve as a line of demarcation between
linear and nonlinear ranking rules. Our interest in this paper lies with subclass F
EQT
and in Gaertner (1992) we formulated an equity axiom to be fullled by all elements of
this class. The basic idea of an equity axiom (see e.g. Hammond (1976) and Deschamps
3
and Gevers (1978)) is the following: in a situation where person j, let's say, is better
o than another person k under two alternatives x and y, and person j prefers y to
x for herself, while person k has the opposite preference, the social decision should
be in favour of alternative x, i.e. x should be (weakly) preferred to y socially. This
would also be the verdict according to Rawls's second principle. In the light of this
requirement, the reader should go back to our cake{division example at the beginning
of this paper and decide for himself (herself) which of the two alternatives to pick in the
two situations. We have argued in Gaertner (1992) that diering degrees of concavity
represent dierent degrees of equity{orientation. One can be \very close" to Rawls's
(1971) single focus rule (viz., his dierence principle) or \quite far away" from this rule.
How can the proper degree of concavity be determined? First of all, it should be
determined by all members of society. On the other hand, however, there is an innite
number of strictly concave transformations of the linear weights r
i
(). In Gaertner
(1992) we made a suggestion on how to determine an individual's desired degree of
concavity of the interpersonal ranking rule or, for that matter, his or her desired degree
of equity{orientation.
Let us consider the following 2{person prole of extended orderings, denoted E
1
:
~
R
1
: (y; 2)(x; 2)(x; 1)(y; 1);
~
R
2
: (y; 2)(x; 2)(x; 1)(y; 1):
According to the strong equity axiom from the social choice literature (see again
Deschamps and Gevers (1978)) and elements from subclass F
EQT
, x will be declared as
preferable to y. We shall now enlarge this basic prole by adding the extended orderings
of persons 3; 4; : : : ; thereby preserving the structure of E
1
. E
2
, for example, is:
~
R
1
: (y; 3)(x; 3)(y; 2)(x; 2)(x; 1)(y; 1);
~
R
2
: (y; 3)(x; 3)(y; 2)(x; 2)(x; 1)(y; 1);
~
R
3
: (y; 3)(x; 3)(y; 2)(x; 2)(x; 1)(y; 1):
We then ask all members of society how they would wish to resolve the situations
E
1
; E
2
; : : :. All those individuals who accept the strong equity axiom will, of course,
say that for E
1
alternative x should be the preferred state. For a moment, let us focus
on just one member of the society. Will he or she nd x also preferable in situation E
2
?
If \yes", will the same verdict hold in E
3
; E
4
; : : :? If at some point in this successive
questioning the individual wishes to switch from \x preferable to y" to \now y should
be preferred to x socially", we would have to nd a transformation such that the
interpersonal ranking rule brings forth exactly this result. It could, of course, be that
given the size of the society, the particular member we are currently focusing on would
always want x to be socially preferred to y. Again, a transformation function would
have to be picked accordingly.
Clearly, for dierent members of society there will be diering \switching points", if
at all, so that in order to end up with one societal interpersonal ranking rule, we would
have to solve an aggregation problem within our larger aggregation procedure. Also,
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society's degree of equity{orientation can be expected to be largely dependent on the
issue at stake (for the last two points see again Gaertner (1992)).
3 Opinions about Distributive Justice: Results from
Questionnaires
In the Appendix six dierent situations are described. The structure of all these cases
is similar to the one in our E
1
; E
2
; : : : proles above. There is always one (group of)
person(s) who is worst o under both alternatives x and y. That person is better o
under x than under y whereas all the other (groups of) individuals who are introduced
successively are better o under y than under x. The six situations were presented to
four classes of undergraduate students at the University of Osnabruck during the years
1989, 1990 and 1993, 1994 as well as to students in the three Baltic states during the
academic year 1997/98. All students were enrolled in economics or business administra-
tion. At the time of the investigation the students had not yet had a course on welfare
economics and theories of distributive justice, such as utilitarianism, Rawlsianism and
game theoretical solutions.
Five of the six situations which the students were confronted with reect dierent
aspects of needs; situation 6 depicts a dilemma which might be described as \human
rights vs. economic benets". In all of the cases with the exception of situation 2
the students played the role of an external judge. In other words, their identication
with the position and the circumstances of a particular person was only of an indirect
nature (the students were implicitly supposed to place themselves in some other person's
shoes). In situation 2, however, the identication with members in, what we have called,
group 2, group 3, etc. (or put dierently: with the beneciaries of program y) most
likely was a direct one. At least in today's Germany, environmental programs are a
much discussed issue; people feel directly aected by these programs, and there also
exists a perpetual debate on whether the aid programs to developing countries should
be extended or not.
Our results on the six situations will be divided into those pertaining to the Os-
nabruck investigation and those recently obtained in the Baltics. The Osnabruck results
will be presented rst. They are compiled in Tables 1{8. Tables 1 and 2 refer to the
investigation in 1989, Tables 3 and 4 show our ndings from the investigation in 1990.
Tables 5{8 refer to the years 1993 and 1994 respectively. For brevity's sake, we shall in
the sequel only comment on the Osnabruck results from the earlier years. The ndings
from the later period proved to be very similar.
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This shows that Osnabruck students in
economics and business administration seem to have a stable judgment over the years.
Table 1 gives the evaluations of 83 undergraduates (cohort 1), Table 2 does the same
for 65 undergraduates (cohort 1'). Table 3 reports the answers of 62 undergraduates
2
There is one exception that should not be concealed. In 1993, the consideration given to the
handicapped person was much lower than in all the other years. We admit that we do not know the
reason for this.
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(cohort 2), while Table 4 shows the evaluations of 93 students (cohort 2'). Cohorts 1
and 2 received the questions in the way in which they are reproduced in the Appendix.
Cohorts 1' and 2' got exactly the same questions. However, in their case we did not
use the technical description by means of extended orderings (y; k)(x; j)(z; i) : : : but
provided a somewhat lengthier verbal account of the same facts instead. Our intuition
was to check whether the way in which the basic situations and their variations were
depicted would or could inuence the decisions of the students. In order to nd an
answer to this question we subjected the responses in the 1989 and in the 1990 in-
vestigation to the Cramer{von Mises two{sample nonparametric test. The results we
obtained are such that with an error probability of 5 %, the hypothesis that for each of
the six situations the cumulative distributions of cohorts 1 and 1', and cohorts 2 and 2'
are identical cannot be rejected for both years. Exactly the same result holds for the
cohorts of the years 1993 and 1994.
Explaining the digits and numbers in Tables 1 to 8, 0 always represents the choice
of alternative x, 1 stands for the choice of alternative y. In order to be more explicit,
0000, for example, refers to those students who took a decision in favour of x in all
cases, i.e. in the basic situation and in all of its variants. 0001, 0011, and 0111 repre-
sent the verdicts of those respondents who decided at one point to revise their original
judgment. Sequences such as 0101 are very dicult to interpret, but this particular
one, for example, occurred only once out of 303 questionnaires during the period ex-
amined. The numbers in the columns of situations 1{6 give the percentages of answers
within each of the four cohorts of undergraduates. Relative frequencies of a revision
or \switch" are contained in the lower part of each table. All those sequences which
begin with 0 represent students who satised the equity axiom introduced in section
2. Correspondingly, all those sequences which start with 1 hint at a violation of the
equity axiom. The percentages of students who satised the equity axiom are given at
the bottom of each table.
We now wish to comment on the individual situations.
Situation 1. Here, the decision to give the money to the handicapped person in
all cases was very strong indeed (66.3 %, 72.3 %, 66.1 %, 58.1 %)
3
. Only a small
percentage of the respondents wanted the amount of money to go into the education of
the intelligent child(ren) right away (7.2 %, 7.7 %, 6.5 %, 9.7 %). These percentages
are, of course, tantamount to the relative frequencies of a violation of the equity axiom.
The gures are astonishingly constant among all cohorts. Those who wished to revise
their original decision which, at the beginning, was in favour of helping the handicapped
person were 26.5 %, 19.8 %, 27.3 %, and 32.1 %. The undergraduates were asked to
comment on their decision. A frequent explanation for a switch was in terms of numbers
of persons who would receive help. In situation 1, the \quantities on either scale" were
clearly dened. It is interesting to note that the number of respondents who at some
point made a switch in favour of a support for the gifted children did not increase in
3
The rst percentage always refers to cohort 1, the second percentage to cohort 1', the third
percentage to cohort 2, the last percentage to cohort 2'.
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a linear way. Actually, this increase was quite diverse among the dierent cohorts of
students.
Situation 2. Here, strong opinions were articulated, either in terms of a resolute
decision in favour of help for the starving people in Africa (30.1 %, 46.1 %, 37.1 %,
36.6 %) or in favour of support for the environmental program (34.9 %, 26.1 %, 22.6 %,
30.1 %). Those who were in favour of helping the hungry but wished to revise their
original decision at a later stage made up 19.2 %, 6.1 %, 25.7 %, and 25.7 % in the
respective cohort. The percentages of respondents violating the equity axiom were
50.6 %, 44.7 %, 33.9 %, and 36.6 % respectively. These frequencies are very high and
reect very well the fact that there were two camps among the students. The most
frequent explanations given were \environmental protection means conservation of the
earth", \people in Germany are better o anyway", but also \people rst, then the
environment" and exactly the opposite slogan \the environment rst, then people". In
situation 2, a unique phenomenon occurred. There was a relatively high percentage
of students choosing the sequence 1110, particularly in the 1989 investigation, viz.
7.2 %, 15.4 %, 8.1 %, and 3.2 %. An interpretation of this pattern does not appear
to be straightforward. Pure misunderstanding of the relevant question could be one
explanation but it could also be that some respondents wanted to revise their decision
which originally was in favour of a support for the better{o, at the very last moment.
Unfortunately, the students provided very little explanation on this particular issue.
We have already pointed out that situation 2 was a case in which the students no
longer acted as an external judge but could directly identify themselves with members of
group 2, group 3, etc. There is a second major dierence to situation 1. In situation 2,
the sizes of group 1, group 2, etc. remained unspecied. This rendered pure number
counting impossible which, as explained, was done by a considerable number of students
in situation 1. We think that there are quite a few policy measures under which the
number of beneciaries cannot be given in an exact way. In this respect, situation 1
was a very simple case.
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Investigation in 1989
Table 1: Relative Frequencies for All Possible Decision Patterns
for Cohort 1 Faced with the Interpersonal Ranking
[sample size n = 83; x coded as 0, y coded as 1]
Sequence Dec. Sit. 1 Sit. 2 Sit. 3 Sit. 4 Sit. 5 Sit. 6
0 0 0 0 0 .6630 .3010 .4700 .9640 .8670 .5780
0 0 0 1 1 .0843 .0241 .0241 .0 .0361 .0723
0 0 1 0 2 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
0 0 1 1 3 .1570 .0723 .0482 .0120 .0723 .0723
0 1 0 0 4 .0 .0 .0120 .0 .0 .0
0 1 0 1 5 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
0 1 1 0 6 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
0 1 1 1 7 .0241 .0964 .1570 .0120 .0120 .0361
1 0 0 0 8 .0 .0 .0241 .0 .0 .0
1 0 0 1 9 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
1 0 1 0 10 .0 .0241 .0 .0 .0 .0
1 0 1 1 11 .0120 .0241 .0120 .0 .0 .0
1 1 0 0 12 .0241 .0361 .0361 .0 .0 .0
1 1 0 1 13 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
1 1 1 0 14 .0 .0723 .0120 .0 .0 .0120
1 1 1 1 15 .0361 .3490 .2050 .0120 .0120 .229
% of switch 26.5 19.2 22.9 2.4 12.0 18.0
% fullment
of equity 92.8 49.4 71.1 98.8 98.8 75.9
axiom
Investigation in 1989
Table 2: Relative Frequencies for All Possible Decision Patterns
for Cohort 1' Not Faced with the Interpersonal Ranking
[sample size n = 65; x coded as 0, y coded as 1]
Sequence Dec. Sit. 1 Sit. 2 Sit. 3 Sit. 4 Sit. 5 Sit. 6
0 0 0 0 0 .7231 .4615 .5692 .9692 .8923 .7385
0 0 0 1 1 .04615 .0 .01538 .03077 .04615 .04615
0 0 1 0 2 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
0 0 1 1 3 .07692 .03077 .03077 .0 .03077 .01538
0 1 0 0 4 .0 .0 .03077 .0 .0 .0
0 1 0 1 5 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
0 1 1 0 6 .0 .03077 .01538 .0 .0 .0
0 1 1 1 7 .07692 .03077 .1077 .0 .01538 .03077
1 0 0 0 8 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
1 0 0 1 9 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
1 0 1 0 10 .0 .01538 .0 .0 .0 .0
1 0 1 1 11 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
1 1 0 0 12 .0 .01538 .03077 .0 .0 .0
1 1 0 1 13 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
1 1 1 0 14 .0 .1538 .0 .0 .0 .0
1 1 1 1 15 .07692 .2615 .2 .0 .01538 .1692
% of switch 19.8 6.1 15.2 3.0 9.1 9.1
% fullment
of equity 92.3 55.3 76.9 100 98.4 83.1
axiom
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Investigation in 1990
Table 3: Relative Frequencies for All Possible Decision Patterns
for Cohort 2 Faced with the Interpersonal Ranking
[sample size n = 62; x coded as 0, y coded as 1]
Sequence Dec. Sit. 1 Sit. 2 Sit. 3 Sit. 4 Sit. 5 Sit. 6
0 0 0 0 0 .66129 .37097 .51613 1.0 .90323 .64516
0 0 0 1 1 .06452 .04839 .03226 .0 .04839 .09677
0 0 1 0 2 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
0 0 1 1 3 .09677 .11290 .08065 .0 .03226 .06452
0 1 0 0 4 .0 .01613 .0 .0 .0 .0
0 1 0 1 5 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
0 1 1 0 6 .0 .01613 .0 .0 .0 .01613
0 1 1 1 7 .11290 .09677 .14516 .0 .01613 .01613
1 0 0 0 8 .01613 .01613 .01613 .0 .0 .0
1 0 0 1 9 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
1 0 1 0 10 .0 .01613 .0 .0 .0 .0
1 0 1 1 11 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
1 1 0 0 12 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .01613
1 1 0 1 13 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
1 1 1 0 14 .0 .08065 .01613 .0 .0 .0
1 1 1 1 15 .04839 .22581 .19355 .0 .0 .14516
% of switch 27.3 25.7 25.7 0.0 9.6 17.6
% fullment
of equity 93.5 66.1 77.5 100 100 83.8
axiom
Investigation in 1990
Table 4: Relative Frequencies for All Possible Decision Patterns
for Cohort 2' Not Faced with the Interpersonal Ranking
[sample size n = 93; x coded as 0, y coded as 1]
Sequence Dec. Sit. 1 Sit. 2 Sit. 3 Sit. 4 Sit. 5 Sit. 6
0 0 0 0 0 .58065 .36559 .45161 .97849 .86022 .54839
0 0 0 1 1 .08602 .05376 .01075 .01075 .08602 .06452
0 0 1 0 2 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
0 0 1 1 3 .15054 .09677 .07527 .0 .02151 .09677
0 1 0 0 4 .0 .0 .01075 .0 .0 .0
0 1 0 1 5 .0 .01075 .0 .0 .0 .0
0 1 1 0 6 .0 .0 .01075 .0 .0 .0
0 1 1 1 7 .08602 .10753 .17204 .0 .0 .07527
1 0 0 0 8 .0 .02151 .0 .0 .0 .0
1 0 0 1 9 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
1 0 1 0 10 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
1 0 1 1 11 .0 .01075 .0 .0 .0 .0
1 1 0 0 12 .01075 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
1 1 0 1 13 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
1 1 1 0 14 .0 .03226 .01075 .0 .0 .0
1 1 1 1 15 .08602 .30108 .25806 .01075 .03226 .21505
% of switch 32.1 25.7 25.7 1.0 10.7 23.5
% fullment
of equity 90.3 63.4 73.2 98.9 96.7 78.4
axiom
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Investigation in 1993
Table 5: Relative Frequencies for All Possible Decision Patterns
for Cohort 3 Faced with the Interpersonal Ranking
[sample size n = 81; x coded as 0, y coded as 1]
Sequence Dec. Sit. 1 Sit. 2 Sit. 3 Sit. 4 Sit. 5 Sit. 6
0 0 0 0 0 .494 .358 .444 .975 .79 .593
0 0 0 1 1 .062 .037 .062 .0 .099 .099
0 0 1 0 2 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
0 0 1 1 3 .148 .099 .074 .012 .074 .037
0 1 0 0 4 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
0 1 0 1 5 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
0 1 1 0 6 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
0 1 1 1 7 .173 .086 .185 .012 .012 .074
1 0 0 0 8 .0 .025 .0 .0 .0 .0
1 0 0 1 9 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
1 0 1 0 10 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
1 0 1 1 11 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
1 1 0 0 12 .0 .0 .025 .0 .0 .012
1 1 0 1 13 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
1 1 1 0 14 .0 .074 .0 .0 .0 .0
1 1 1 1 15 .123 .321 .21 .0 .025 .185
% of switch 38.3 22.2 32.1 2.4 18.5 21.0
% fullment
of equity 87.7 58.0 76.5 100 97.5 80.3
axiom
Investigation in 1993
Table 6: Relative Frequencies for All Possible Decision Patterns
for Cohort 3' Not Faced with the Interpersonal Ranking
[sample size n = 79; x coded as 0, y coded as 1]
Sequence Dec. Sit. 1 Sit. 2 Sit. 3 Sit. 4 Sit. 5 Sit. 6
0 0 0 0 0 .418 .405 .304 .987 .886 .367
0 0 0 1 1 .101 .025 .089 .0 .038 .152
0 0 1 0 2 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
0 0 1 1 3 .228 .063 .127 .0 .051 .139
0 1 0 0 4 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
0 1 0 1 5 .0 .0 .0 .013 .0 .0
0 1 1 0 6 .0 .0 .013 .0 .0 .0
0 1 1 1 7 .101 .114 .241 .0 .0 .089
1 0 0 0 8 .0 .025 .0 .0 .013 .013
1 0 0 1 9 .025 .013 .0 .0 .0 .0
1 0 1 0 10 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
1 0 1 1 11 .0 .013 .0 .0 .0 .0
1 1 0 0 12 .0 .025 .0 .0 .0 .013
1 1 0 1 13 .0 .0 .013 .0 .0 .0
1 1 1 0 14 .0 .038 .013 .0 .0 .0
1 1 1 1 15 .127 .278 .203 .0 .013 .228
% of switch 43.0 20.2 45.7 0.0 8.9 38.0
% fullment
of equity 84.8 60.7 76.1 100 97.7 74.7
axiom
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Investigation in 1994
Table 7: Relative Frequencies for All Possible Decision Patterns
for Cohort 4 Faced with the Interpersonal Ranking
[sample size n = 65; x coded as 0, y coded as 1]
Sequence Dec. Sit. 1 Sit. 2 Sit. 3 Sit. 4 Sit. 5 Sit. 6
0 0 0 0 0 .615 .369 .354 .938 .877 .431
0 0 0 1 1 .062 .0 .077 .031 .062 .077
0 0 1 0 2 .0 .015 .0 .0 .0 .0
0 0 1 1 3 .138 .138 .108 .015 .0 .062
0 1 0 0 4 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
0 1 0 1 5 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
0 1 1 0 6 .015 .015 .0 .0 .0 .0
0 1 1 1 7 .092 .123 .138 .0 .031 .169
1 0 0 0 8 .0 .015 .0 .0 .015 .015
1 0 0 1 9 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
1 0 1 0 10 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
1 0 1 1 11 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
1 1 0 0 12 .0 .031 .031 .0 .0 .015
1 1 0 1 13 .0 .0 .015 .0 .0 .0
1 1 1 0 14 .0 .031 .015 .0 .0 .0
1 1 1 1 15 .077 .262 .262 .015 .015 .231
% of switch 29.2 26.1 32.3 4.6 9.3 30.8
% fullment
of equity 92.2 66.0 67.7 98.4 97.0 73.9
axiom
Investigation in 1994
Table 8: Relative Frequencies for All Possible Decision Patterns
for Cohort 4' Not Faced with the Interpersonal Ranking
[sample size n = 63; x coded as 0, y coded as 1]
Sequence Dec. Sit. 1 Sit. 2 Sit. 3 Sit. 4 Sit. 5 Sit. 6
0 0 0 0 0 .603 .413 .413 .952 .921 .667
0 0 0 1 1 .016 .016 .0 .0 .016 .048
0 0 1 0 2 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
0 0 1 1 3 .095 .048 .016 .0 .0 .048
0 1 0 0 4 .0 .0 .016 .0 .016 .0
0 1 0 1 5 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
0 1 1 0 6 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
0 1 1 1 7 .143 .079 .270 .016 .016 .032
1 0 0 0 8 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
1 0 0 1 9 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
1 0 1 0 10 .0 .016 .0 .0 .0 .0
1 0 1 1 11 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
1 1 0 0 12 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
1 1 0 1 13 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
1 1 1 0 14 .0 .079 .032 .0 .0 .0
1 1 1 1 15 .143 .349 .254 .032 .032 .206
% of switch 25.4 14.3 28.6 1.6 3.2 12.8
% fullment
of equity 85.7 55.6 71.5 96.8 96.9 79.5
axiom
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Situation 3. Again, quite explicit points of view were revealed. In contrast to case 2,
however, a once for all decision in favour of helping the worst{o, i.e. those who were
in danger of their lives, occurred much more frequently. It was in almost all cohorts
more than twice as strong as the view to support right from the beginning those who
suered from vitamin deciency. Consequently, the percentages of students violating
the equity axiom were considerably lower now (28.9 %, 23.1 %, 22.5 %, 26.8 %). The
frequencies of switching were exactly the same as in case 2 for the 1990 investigation
but were somewhat higher for the 1989 study (22.9 %, 15.2 %).
Whereas situations 2 and 3 were cases of \urgent needs vs. urgent or severe needs",
situations 4 and 5 can be characterized as \urgent or severe needs vs. luxury goods".
We should like to mention that there was no intention at all to be provoking in these
two situations. We wanted to see (a) how strongly the students would actually move
into the \right" direction when going from case 3 to case 4 and to experience (b) how
discriminating their mind would be when a smaller variation in terms of needs was
introduced (from case 4 to case 5).
Situation 4. There was almost no switching (2.4 %, 3.0 %, 0.0 %, 1.0 %) and the
violation of the equity axiom was negligible (1.2 %, 0.0 %, 0.0 %, 1.1 %). The view to
disregard the wine lovers totally was 96.4 %, 96.9 %, 100 %, and 97.8 % in all cohorts.
Situation 5. The point of view to ignore completely those who would love to consume
Bordeaux wines was 86.7 %, 89.2 %, 90.3 %, and 86.0 % in the respective cohorts. The
desire to revise the original decision occurred at 12.0 %, 9.1 %, 9.6 %, and 10.7 %.
When one compares the last two sequences of percentages to those in situation 4, one
can indeed get some conrmation for the \discriminating mind" of the students. The
percentage of undergraduates who violated the equity axiom was again negligible in
each cohort.
Situation 6. This case was a particularly dicult one since it is about the restoration
of basic human rights. The students were asked to evaluate rights against economic
benets. Strong viewpoints were again articulated. The relative frequencies of students
saying that human rights should not be traded against a quick economic recovery were
57.8 %, 73.8 %, 64.5 %, and 54.8 %. A resolute decision in favour of a quick revival
of the economy was taken by 22.9 %, 16.9 %, 14.5 %, and 21.5 %. The percentages of
respondents who at some point revised their decision which originally was in favour of
basic human rights were 18.0 %, 9.1 %, 17.6 %, and 23.5 %. A violation of the equity
axiom occurred with the following frequencies : 24.1 %, 16.9 %, 16.2 %, and 21.6 %.
Some of the explanations given were \no trade{o between basic rights and money if
the period of curtailment is indeterminate", \fundamental rights are more important
than well{being", and \basic needs are more important than basic rights" (in the latter
explanation, obviously, basic needs did not comprise fundamental rights).
As already mentioned before, some of the students chose sequences that are dicult
to understand and to interpret. It should be mentioned, however, that the occurrence
of such sequences was quite rare. In most cases, these involved just one respondent.
However, most of these \unintelligible" sequences popped up under situations 2 and 3
where the fullment of the equity axiom was lower than in the rest of the cases.
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Table 9: Relative Frequencies for All Possible Decision Patterns
for the Baltic Cohort Not Faced with the Interpersonal Ranking
[sample size n = 67; x coded as 0, y coded as 1]
Sequence Dec. Sit. 1 Sit. 2 Sit. 3 Sit. 4 Sit. 5 Sit. 6
0 0 0 0 0 0.03 0.119 0.224 0.731 0.522 0.149
0 0 0 1 1 0 0.06 0.075 0.164 0.194 0.149
0 0 1 0 2 0.045 0.06 0 0.03 0.03 0.015
0 0 1 1 3 0.179 0.134 0.119 0.075 0.149 0.134
0 1 0 0 4 0 0 0.045 0 0 0.015
0 1 0 1 5 0.015 0.015 0.015 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 6 0.045 0.03 0.03 0 0 0.015
0 1 1 1 7 0.343 0.104 0.179 0 0.075 0.149
1 0 0 0 8 0.015 0 0.045 0 0 0.015
1 0 0 1 9 0.015 0.03 0 0 0.015 0
1 0 1 0 10 0.015 0.03 0.045 0 0 0
1 0 1 1 11 0.03 0 0.03 0 0 0.015
1 1 0 0 12 0.015 0.045 0.015 0 0.015 0.015
1 1 0 1 13 0.015 0.015 0.045 0 0 0.015
1 1 1 0 14 0 0.045 0 0 0 0.03
1 1 1 1 15 0.239 0.313 0.134 0 0 0.284
% of switch 0.522 0.298 0.373 0.259 0.418 0.432
% fullment
of equity 0.657 0.522 0.687 1.000 0.970 0.626
axiom
Table 10: Condence Intervals for the Relative Frequencies
for All Possible Decision Patterns, the Baltic Results
Sequ. Sit. 1 Sit. 2 Sit. 3 Sit. 4 Sit. 5 Sit. 6
0000 .008 .105 .061 .221 .139 .340 .612 .824 .403 .640 .082 .256
0001 .000 .056 .023 .146 .032 .166 .093 .273 .116 .307 .082 .256
0010 .015 .126 .023 .146 .000 .056 .008 .105 .008 .105 .003 .082
0011 .104 .290 .071 .238 .061 .221 .032 .165 .082 .256 .071 .238
0100 .000 .056 .000 .056 .015 .126 .000 .056 .000 .056 .003 .082
0101 .003 .082 .003 .082 .003 .082 .000 .056 .000 .056 .000 .056
0110 .015 .126 .008 .105 .008 .105 .000 .056 .000 .056 .003 .082
0111 .239 .465 .051 .203 .104 .290 .000 .056 .032 .165 .082 .256
1000 .003 .082 .000 .056 .015 .126 .000 .056 .000 .056 .003 .082
1001 .003 .082 .008 .105 .000 .056 .000 .056 .003 .082 .000 .056
1010 .003 .082 .008 .105 .015 .126 .000 .056 .000 .056 .000 .056
1011 .008 .105 .000 .056 .008 .105 .000 .056 .000 .056 .003 .082
1100 .003 .082 .015 .126 .003 .082 .000 .056 .003 .082 .003 .082
1101 .003 .082 .003 .082 .015 .126 .000 .056 .000 .056 .003 .082
1110 .000 .056 .015 .126 .000 .056 .000 .056 .000 .056 .008 .105
1111 .151 .356 .213 .435 .072 .238 .000 .056 .000 .056 .188 .404
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Let us turn to a discussion of the results from the Baltics (see Table 9). The students
were probants from Riga, Tartu and Vilnius, the majority coming from the latter town.
After the detailed description of the Osnabruck data, we wish to be relatively brief.
The gures in the tables should have become self{explanatory by now.
The overall verdict is that the results from the East are vastly dierent from those
from the West. This judgment manifests itself in a variety of ways. We can start
with the last observation from the West referring to the \unintelligible" sequences.
These occur much more frequently in the Baltic investigation. We do not know the
reason for this. It can be pure misunderstanding of the described situations | we
should mention that all the material to which the Eastern students were exposed was in
English. However, all these students were enrolled in a program taught in this language.
In general, fullment of the equity axiom was substantially lower in the Baltics than
in Germany (with the exception of situations 4 and 5, of course). Also, the percentage
of switches in situations 1 and 6 was much higher in the East. Most stunning indeed
are the decisions made in situations 1 and 6, though clear dierences also occurred in
most of the other cases. Compare the relative frequencies for the sequence 0000 in
situations 1 and 6 to the corresponding frequencies for the students from Osnabruck.
We calculated the condence intervals for the frequencies of all chosen sequences from
the Baltics based on a normal approximation of the binomial distribution (see Table 10).
For the 0000 sequence, the frequencies from the West clearly lie outside the condence
intervals for the corresponding frequencies from the Baltics. There is just one exception
(situation 3 in 1993, Table 6). For the sequence 0111, this observation holds true with
respect to situations 1, 2, and 6 for most of the results as well. Remember that 0111 is
a judgmental position where the rst variation after the base situation already elicits
a change of orientation in favour of the group that is better o. For the sequence 1111
a similar statement cannot be made. A more detailed picture is given in Table 11
where the dierences between the relative frequencies observed for all possible decision
patterns are calculated. For this particular table, the data from Tables 8 and 9 was
used where the number of probants was roughly the same. A negative sign in the table
indicates that the associated relative frequency for pattern 0000, let's say, is smaller in
the Baltics than in Osnabruck. The table shows very clearly that the entries associated
with the response 0000 are negative in each and every situation, and the dierence
is considerable. The majority of the signs associated with the sequences 0111, 0011
and 0001 is positive suggesting that meaningful switches are more likely to occur in
the Baltic sample. The pattern observed for the extreme response 1111 is mixed. In
cases of negative signs the dierences are small, leading to the question concerning the
statistical signicance of the so far purely descriptive evidence on dierences.
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Table 11: Dierences between Densities p
balt
  p
ger
.
Sequence Dec. Sit. 1 Sit. 2 Sit. 3 Sit. 4 Sit. 5 Sit.6
0 0 0 0 0 -.5733 -.2933 -.1888 -.2210 -.3982 -.5174
0 0 0 1 1 -.0159 .0438 .0746 .1642 .1782 .1016
0 0 1 0 2 .0448 .0597 .0000 .0299 .0299 .0149
0 0 1 1 3 .0839 .0867 .1035 .0746 .1493 .0867
0 1 0 0 4 .0000 .0000 .0289 .0000 -.0159 .0149
0 1 0 1 5 .0149 .0149 .0149 .0000 .0000 .0000
0 1 1 0 6 .0448 .0299 .0299 .0000 .0000 .0149
0 1 1 1 7 .2004 .0251 -.0907 -.0159 .0588 .1175
1 0 0 0 8 .0149 .0000 .0448 .0000 .0000 .0149
1 0 0 1 9 .0149 .0299 .0000 .0000 .0149 .0000
1 0 1 0 10 .0149 .0140 .0448 .0000 .0000 .0000
1 0 1 1 11 .0299 .0000 .0299 .0000 .0000 .0149
1 1 0 0 12 .0149 .0448 .0149 .0000 .0149 .0149
1 1 0 1 13 .0149 .0149 .0448 .0000 .0000 .0149
1 1 1 0 14 .0000 -.0346 -.0317 .0000 .0000 .0299
1 1 1 1 15 .0959 -.0358 -.1196 -.0317 -.0317 .0772
To clarify this question, we used the 
2
{test. For each of the six situations, we
tried to generate evidence against the hypothesis that the distribution of the responses
in Osnabruck is identical to the distribution found for the Baltic responses (H
o
). The
results of the 
2
{tests are given in Table 12.
Table 12: Summary of 
2
test results

2
output Sit. 1 Sit. 2 Sit. 3 Sit. 4 Sit. 5 Sit.6
CHI 57.416 28.423 34.126 22.008 35.557 41.836
p-value 0.000 0.005 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.000
degrees of freedom 13 12 13 5 8 12
The tests produce clear evidence against the null hypothesis in each and every
situation considered. If we test at the level  = 0:05, the null is rejected in each case.
A comparison of the p-values (probability of observing a realization of the test statistic
larger than or equal to the one observed under H
0
) suggests that the evidence for a
dierence in the distribution of the responses is especially strong in situation 1 and
situation 6.
4 Concluding Remarks
While bargaining theory has been oering an increasing number of experimental results
during the last 20 years or so, social choice theory has only seen a few \experimental"
ndings up to this point. Most of these were gained by means of questionnaires. Among
social choice theorists, the best known results stem from an investigation undertaken by
Yaari and Bar{Hillel (1984). One should, however, also mention ndings by Schokkaert
and Overlaet (1989), Schokkaert and Capeau (1990) and Frohlich, Oppenheimer and
Eavey (1987 a, 1987 b), the latter pieces coming from the political science literature.
Among other things, Bar{Hillel and Yaari found that in problems which reect needs,
many of their respondents chose the \maximin" rule as their guiding principle. We saw
that in several of our situations the strict focus on the worst{o group was also a widely
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held view (situation 1, situations 4{6) | among Western students. Concern for the
plight of the handicapped and the issue of basic rights { although a topic in the ocial
political sphere { is still in its infancy in wide segments of the society. As our sample
shows, disregard for the disadvantaged individual and for fundamental rights is rather
pronounced even among well{educated individuals. The need to catch up economically
seems to dominate other considerations. We expected a phenomenon like this but were
surprised to see how forceful this attitude currently is. When we compare the relative
frequencies for 0000 and 1111, we realize that in the West the former is larger than
the latter by a factor ranging between 2 and 4.5, in the East the former is roughly
50 % smaller than the latter. In situations 2 and 3, the results are less clear{cut. We
mentioned above that also Western students became divided over the underlying issues.
Let us return to the theoretical argument from section 2 that in order to determine
society's equity{orientation the proper degree of concavity of the transformation func-
tion should be decided upon by all members of society. We have to take a closer look at
those instances where the evaluating persons revised their original decision. The tables
do not provide us with a homogeneous picture but some conclusions can be drawn. For
Western students, switching was highest in situations 1 and 3 and lowest in cases 4
and 5. The latter cases were simple \maximin{situations" for students from both West
and East. For situations 2 and 3, with very few exceptions, the sequence 0111 generally
occurred more frequently within each group than the sequence 0011 which again oc-
curred more often than 0001. Our data does not reveal that there was more switching
when two strongly opposed views were held among the students. On the contrary. The
reader should, for example, compare the results in situation 1 with those in situations
2 and 3.
In fact, one of the reasons why we did our empirical study was to see whether
bringing in more and more (groups of) persons who have preferences that are strictly
opposed to those of the worst{o person or group makes individuals revise their original
distributive decision at some point. In other words, we were trying to nd out whether
something like the integer k

exists from which point on a distributive judgment is
reversed. In four out of the six situations, the fraction of Osnabruck students who
revised their decision ranged between 1/10 and 1/3. For the Baltic students, this
fraction ranged between 1/4 and 1/2. There was, of course, a lot of variance among
the distributional problems as there was some variance among the individual k

i
. But
that was to be expected. Our investigation showed quite clearly that the evaluations
of the members of society, their degree of equity{orientation as well as their readiness
to revise their initial verdict largely depended on the issue at stake and on the cultural
and political background of the students. Elster (1991) coined the term \local justice"
which means that small{scale problems are solved according to a number of dierent
principles.
In an eort to substantiate this nding we applied Friedman's nonparametric F -test
to generate evidence against the hypothesis that individuals do not revise their decision
as the context (reected by our situations 1 to 6) varies. All 15 possible hypotheses
H
0
: decision under situation i equals the decision under situation j (i 6= j) were tested
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using both the Baltic results as well as the evidence from Osnabruck (1994). In both
cases we nd overwhelming evidence for the existence of context eects. The evidence
in favour of such eects tends to be especially strong whenever the hypothesis involves
situation 4 or 5 and one of the other situations. In a next step we contrasted the out-
comes of the test procedure obtained for the German data with those computed for the
Baltic case. This comparison revealed interesting dierences. While the students in
Osnabruck tend to perceive, process and decide situations 1 and 6 in a similar fashion
(we cannot reject the null hypothesis since the observed value of the test statistic is as-
sociated with a p-value of 0.614), we nd evidence for context dependence in the sample
involving the Baltic students since the associated p-value equals 0.0272
4
. In the two
cultural settings the decision problems at hand are most likely solved by using dierent
principles. The fact that in the Soviet period there was little concern for individuals
subjected to physical and mental disabilities may explain the observed dierence. Al-
though we nd signicant dierences in the densities for situation 1 and 6 (see Table 9),
we nevertheless see that the percentage of Baltic probants who are primarily concerned
with economic growth (28.4%) is close to the percentage of those who would support
the education of gifted children, \no matter what" (23.9%). This manifests a certain
attitude (or Weltanschauung). To those who prefer economic growth to basic rights,
capital investment seems to be more important than an improvement in the abilities of
a handicapped individual. This shows that the societal background may also matter a
lot.
In this paper we have only referred to the aggregated data from the Baltics. The
results from Tartu in Estonia are particularly stunning. In situations 1 and 2, for
example, not a single person chose the sequence 0000,while 2/3 of the students selected
1111. This may be purely accidental since, unfortunately, there were only 9 respondents.
A statistical analysis is unwarranted in such a case.
4
Since we have already presented a large number of tables, we abstain from reproducing another
table at this point.
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Appendix
Situation 1:
A small society has received a certain amount of money which can be used either
to provide some help and assistance for a seriously handicapped person or to further
the education of a highly intelligent child. The child could receive a good education
in languages and in natural sciences, let's say. Let the seriously retarded person be
person 1; if the sum of money were used for her support (alternative x), she would
be able to learn some very basic things, so that at least in certain areas of daily life
she would no longer be totally dependent on the assistance from other people. Let the
intelligent child be person 2; the investment into its education represents alternative y.
The interpersonal welfare ranking reads:
(y; 2)(x; 2)(x; 1)(y; 1)
Which alternative should be realized in your view, x or y?
(a) Imagine that the sum of money which could be used to help the handicapped
person, is so large that, on the other hand, this amount would allow to educate
not only person 2 but also a second child (person 3) who is even somewhat more
intelligent than person 2. Person 3 would, therefore, benet even a bit more from
the education so that the following interpersonal welfare ranking can be assumed:
(y; 3)(y; 2)(x; 3)(x; 2)(x; 1)(y; 1)
Would you choose x or y under these conditions?
(b) Imagine that if the money were used to nance alternative y it would be possible
to educate still another child (person 4). The reason may simply be \economies of
scale" or the fact that a talented teacher will be able to provide a good education
for several children simultanously. Let us assume that all the other characteristics
of the situation remain as before. The interpersonal welfare ranking now reads:
(y; 4)(y; 3)(y; 2)(x; 4)(x; 3)(x; 2)(x; 1)(y; 1)
Which alternative should be picked in your view, x or y?
(c) Add another child to the situation (person 5), who could also receive an instruction
in languages and the natural sciences out of the given budget. Everything also
remains the same and the interpersonal welfare ranking reads:
(y; 5)(y; 4)(y; 3)(y; 2)(x; 5)(x; 4)(x; 3)(x; 2)(x; 1)(y; 1)
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Would you want x or y to be realized?
Situation 2:
Imagine that due to an unexpectedly large prot of the Federal Reserve (or an
unexpectedly large budgetary surplus, if you prefer), Government has the possibility
to spend several billion marks (DM) either on environmental protection within its own
territory (alternative y) or to spend that amount of money to nance an aid program
against hunger in various countries of Subsaharan Africa (alternative x). Given the
available amount of money, the environmental program would aim at improving the
current situation of the North Sea. This would primarily benet the shing industry
and, perhaps to a somewhat lesser degree, the people who spend their vacation along
the North Sea. Henceforth, these two groups are called \person 2". Those who suer
from famine in Subsaharan Africa are \person 1". Undoubtedly, both the shermen
and the vacationers in the country are, in terms of welfare, better o than the starving
people in Africa, independent of whether alternative x or alternative y will be realized.
Which alternative should be chosen according to your view, if the following interpersonal
welfare ranking is true:
(y; 2)(x; 2)(x; 1)(y; 1)
(a) Imagine now that the prot of the Federal Reserve (or the budgetary surplus) has
turned out to be higher than anticipated originally. On the one hand, the war
against hunger could now be intensied, on the other the environmental program
could be extended. The proposal is to improve the quality of the air in the
neighbourhood of charcoal power plants. The group beneting from this measure
will be called \person 3". We shall assume that this group will always be better
o than groups 2 and 1 with respect to alternative y, and be denitely better
o than group 1 with respect to alternative x. We are postulating the following
interpersonal welfare ranking, where y again stands for environmental protection
and x stands for relief of hunger (both programs would, of course, now be larger
due to the higher amount of nancial resources):
(y; 3)(y; 2)(x; 3)(x; 2)(x; 1)(y; 1)
(b) Assume that it has become clear that \economies of scale" will occur in the en-
vironmental program, once alternative y should be realized. We postulate that
a program for cleaner water in rivers should also be feasible which would benet
primarily those citizens of the country (group 4) who live close to the rivers (it
seems obvious that cleaner water in rivers would, among other things, increase
the stock of sh). In other words, not only would groups 2 and 3 benet from
the environmental program but also an additional group. We want to postulate
the following interpersonal welfare ranking, where y again stands for the environ-
mental program and x stand for the aid program for Subsaharan Africa:
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(y; 4)(y; 3)(y; 2)(x; 4)(x; 3)(x; 2)(x; 1)(y; 1)
Which alternative should now be realized, x or y?
(c) Imagine that, given the nancial resources, again an enlargement of the envi-
ronmental program appears realistic. It has, for example, been found out that
an additional program aiming at a reduction of trac noise along the highways
would be nancially feasible. Through this investment, still another group of peo-
ple (group 5) would experience an increase in its living conditions. We assume
that group 5 is better o than all the other groups under alternative y and that it
is at least better o than group 1 under alternative x. We postulate the following
interpersonal welfare ranking:
(y; 5)(y; 4)(y; 3)(y; 2)(x; 5)(x; 4)(x; 3)(x; 2)(x; 1)(y; 1)
Which alternative should now be realized according to your view, x or y?
Situation 3:
Imagine a country which has a severe shortage of western currencies. The governing
body of this country has the possibility to purchase on the world market either a cer-
tain number of badly needed dialysis machines (alternative x) that cannot be produced
within the country, or a certain quantity of vitamin pills as well as tropical fruit (alter-
native y). This quantity would only be able to satisfy the urgent needs of a relatively
small group of persons. The realization of both alternatives together or a combination
of both alternatives to some extent is assumed to be infeasible. The group of people suf-
fering from kidney problems is group 1, the group of people beneting from the import
of vitamins and fruits is group 2. There is unanimous agreement in the country that
all pregnant women should make up group 2. Since the persons with kidney trouble
are clearly worse o than the expectant mothers, the following interpersonal welfare
ordering appears to be justied:
(y; 2)(x; 2)(x; 1)(y; 1)
Which alternative should be realized in your view, x or y?
(a) Imagine now that the world market price for vitamin pills and tropical fruit has
fallen. If alternative y were realized it would be possible to provide not only the
expectant mothers, but also all the country's babies and toddlers (group 3) with
the needed vitamins. The price of dialysis machines is assumed to rest unchanged,
however. The welfare levels of groups 2 and 3 are clearly higher than the level of
group 1 both under y and under x so that the following interpersonal ordering for
the three groups appears plausible:
(y; 3)(y; 2)(x; 3)(x; 2)(x; 1)(y; 1)
Would you choose alternative x or alternative y?
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(b) Let us imagine that there is a further decline in the world market price for vitamin
pills and tropical fruit so that it turns out that under the given amount of western
currencies also the country's adolescents (group 4) could be provided with vita-
mins if alternative y were chosen. We then postulate the following interpersonal
welfare ordering:
(y; 4)(y; 3)(y; 2)(x; 4)(x; 3)(x; 2)(x; 1)(y; 1)
Which alternative should be chosen, x or y?
(c) The world market price of vitamin pills and tropical fruit declines once more
so that under alternative y the given amount of western currencies would now
suce to provide those workers of the country who are engaged in physical labour
(group 5) with the needed vitamins. We postulate the following interpersonal
welfare ordering:
(y; 5)(y; 4)(y; 3)(y; 2)(x; 4)(x; 3)(x; 2)(x; 5)(x; 1)(y; 1)
Which of the two alternatives, x or y, should now be chosen?
Situation 4:
Imagine a country which has a severe shortage of western currencies. The governing
body of this country has the possibility to purchase on the world market either a certain
number of badly needed dialysis machines (alternative x) that cannot be produced
within the country, or a certain quantity of expensive wines from the Bordeaux region
that are desired by certain segments of the society. The realization of both alternatives
together or a combination of both alternatives to some extent is assumed to be infeasible.
It is hypothesized that the wines from Bordeaux have such a high price that they could
only be purchased by a small group of relatively well{o citizens (group 2). The group
of people suering from kidney problems is group 1. It goes without saying that due to
their illness, the dialysis patients are worse o than the potential buyers of expensive
French wines so that the following interpersonal welfare ordering seems to be justied,
where x refers to the import of dialysis machines and y refers to the import of wines
from Bordeaux:
(y; 2)(x; 2)(x; 1)(y; 1)
Which of the two alternatives should be chosen according to your view, x or y?
(a) Imagine that the price of Bordeaux wines has fallen so that a second group within
society (group 3) would be able to purchase these wines if alternative y were
realized. Clearly, the quantity of imported wines could be increased due to the
lower market price. The price of dialysis machines is supposed to remain constant.
The welfare ordering now reads:
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(y; 2)(y; 3)(x; 2)(x; 3)(x; 1)(y; 1)
Which alternative should be selected now, x or y?
(b) Let us assume that a further decrease in price of the Bordeaux wines has occurred
so that under the given amount of western currencies an even larger quantity of
wines could be imported now. Therefore, due to the lower price per bottle, yet
another group within society (group 4) could become a buyer of those wines. We
assume the following interpersonal welfare ordering:
(y; 2)(y; 3)(y; 4)(x; 2)(x; 3)(x; 4)(x; 1)(y; 1)
Which alternative should be realized, x or y?
(c) The price of wines from Bordeaux is supposed to fall once more so that, again,
another group within society (group 5) would be put in a position to purchase
these wines if alternative y were realized. Therefore, the following welfare ordering
appears plausible:
(y; 2)(y; 3)(y; 4)(y; 5)(x; 2)(x; 3)(x; 4)(x; 5)(x; 1)(y; 1)
Would you choose x or y in this situation?
Situation 5:
Once again, imagine a country with a severe shortage of western currencies. The
governing body of this country has the possibility either to purchase on the world
market a certain amount of inexpensive clothing (alternative x) which would allow the
more needy segments of society (group 1) to signicantly improve its welfare level, or
to import a certain quantity of expensive wines from the Bordeaux region (alternative
y) that a small group of rather well{to{do citizens of the country (group 2) would
like to acquire. The realization of both alternatives together or a combination of both
alternatives to some extent is assumed to be infeasible. We postulate the following
interpersonal welfare ordering:
(y; 2)(x; 2)(x; 1)(y; 1)
Which alternative should be chosen according to your view, x or y?
(a) Imagine that the price of Bordeaux wines has fallen so that a second group within
society (group 3) would be able to purchase these wines if alternative y were
realized. This additional group 3 is supposed to be better o in terms of welfare
than group 1. We assume that the price of inexpensive clothing remains the same
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so that the quantity of imports would not change, should x be realized. The
interpersonal welfare ordering now is:
(y; 2)(y; 3)(x; 2)(x; 3)(x; 1)(y; 1)
Should x or y be chosen?
(b) Let us assume that a further decrease in price of the Bordeaux wines has occurred
so that under the given amount of western currencies an even larger quantity of
wines could be imported now. Therefore, due to the lower price per bottle, yet
another group within society (group 4) could become a buyer of these wines. We
postulate the following interpersonal welfare ordering:
(y; 2)(y; 3)(y; 4)(x; 2)(x; 3)(x; 4)(x; 1)(y; 1)
Which of the alternatives x or y should now be realized?
(c) The price of wines from Bordeaux is supposed to fall once more so that, again,
another group within society (group 5) would be put in a position to purchase
these wines if alternative y were realized. Therefore, the following welfare ordering
appears plausible:
(y; 2)(y; 3)(y; 4)(y; 5)(x; 2)(x; 3)(x; 4)(x; 5)(x; 1)(y; 1)
Would you choose x or y in this situation?
Situation 6:
Imagine a country which had been totally run down economically by a long-lasting
dictatorship. Finally, the country could get rid of this dictatorship. Furthermore,
imagine that an international bank group is oering a rather large loan (under very
favourable conditions of repayment) to this country for economic reconstruction (alter-
native y). The prerequisite for this loan, however, is, so the consortium declares, that
the employees of the country be neither granted a right to strike nor the free choice
of one's occupation. This precondition should be valid for the foreseeable future. If
the new Government were unwilling to enforce this curtailment of individual rights,
no loan would be oered, and, therefore, the country would have to pull itself up by
its bootstraps (alternative x). In that case, the country would, of course, have the
option to reinstall the right to strike and other basic rights, a measure which had been
promised to the citizens of the country after the fall of the dictatorship. If the bank loan
were granted, the large enterprises (group 2) were the rst to experience an economic
recovery. The workers and employees in the rms (group 1) would be hard hit by the
restriction of basic rights. The interpersonal welfare ranking, therefore, reads:
(y; 2)(x; 2)(x; 1)(y; 1)
What should the country do in your view, should it decide in favour of y or x?
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(a) Imagine that the initial situation would undergo the following modication: The
loan which is oered would have such a large volume that an additional group of
the population, the self-employed persons with a small or middle-sized business
activity, let's say, would benet from the nancial aid (group 3). Let this alter-
native again be denoted by y. Alternative x remains as before. The following
welfare ranking is now postulated:
(y; 2)(y; 3)(x; 2)(x; 3)(x; 1)(y; 1)
Should the country choose x or y?
(b) Imagine again a change of the initial situation: The bank loan oered were so large
that under alternative y still another group of the population, the civil servants,
let's say, would realize larger economic benets (group 4). Alternative x remains
unchanged. The interpersonal welfare ranking now reads:
(y; 2)(y; 3)(y; 4)(x; 2)(x; 3)(x; 4)(x; 1)(y; 1)
Which alternative should now be picked by the country?
(c) A further variation: we shall assume that still another group within the popula-
tion, the retired members of society (group 5), would experience an improvement
of their economic situation under alternative y. Alternative x remains unchanged.
The following welfare ranking is now postulated:
(y; 2)(y; 3)(y; 4)(y; 5)(x; 2)(x; 3)(x; 4)(x; 5)(x; 1)(y; 1)
Which alternative should now be chosen according to your view, x or y?
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